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and	occupied	by	a	non-rent	paying	tenant,	should	be	eligible	
for	bonus	depreciation.
ENDNOTES
 1 Job	Creation	and	Worker	Assistance	Act	of	2002,	Pub.L.	
No.	107-147,	§	101,	116	Stat.	40	 (2002),	enacting	 I.R.C.	§	
168(k).	See	generally	Harl,	Agricultural Law	§	29.02[8][h][iv]	
(2008);	Harl,	Agricultural Law Manual	§	4.03[4][l]	(2008);	
Harl, Farm Income Tax Manual	§	3.20[3]	(2008	ed.).
 2 I.R.C.	§	168(k)(2)(G),	(k)(1).
 3 Pub.	L.	No.	108-27,	§	201(b).
 4 Pub.	 L.	 No.	 110-185,	 §	 103,	 amending	 I.R.C.	 §	
168(k)(1)(A).
 5 I.R.C.	§	168(k)(2)(i)(II).
 6 I.R.C.	§	168(c).
 7 I.R.C.	§	168(e)(1).
 8 I.R.C.	§	168(b)(3)(B).
 9 Pub.	L.	No.	99-514,	§	203,	100	Stat.	2126	(1986).
 10 I.R.C.	§	168(e)(2)(A)(i).	See	Ltr.	Rul.	9825024,	March	
20,	1998	(nursing	home	business	owned	by	S	corporation	was	
residential	rental	property);	CCA	Ltr.	Rul.	200526002,	May	
9,	2005	(owner-occupied	residential	rental	property	(as	to	one	
of	eight	units)	met	test	of	80	percent	of	gross	rental	income	
derived	from	rental	units;	portion	used	as	office	was	eligible	
for	depreciation	over	27	½	years).
 11 I.R.C.	§	168(e)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
 12 I.R.C.	§	168(e)(2)(A)(ii)(II).
 13 Rev.	Rul.	70-72,	1970-1	C.B.	15.
 14 I.R.C.	§	168(e)(2)(A)(ii).
 15 I.R.C.	§§	168(e)(2)(B),	168(c)(1).
 16 I.R.C.	§	168(e)(3)(C)(v).
Can	 those	 definitions	 be	met	with	 a	 share	 rent	 farm	 tenant	
occupying	a	tenant	house	without	paying	rent?	That	is	typically	
the	case	with	share	rent	farm	tenants.	Indeed,	IRS	ruled	in	1970	
that	occupancy	of	a	dwelling	by	a	farm	tenant	does	not	produce	
income	 for	 the	 tenant.13	Moreover,	 it	would	be	 unusual	 for	 a	
farm	or	ranch	house	to	be	occupied	in	part	by	the	owner.	With	
rent	usually	not	paid,	and	with	no	rental	imputed	to	the	tenant-
occupant,	 it	 is	 fairly	 obvious	 that	 the	 statutory	 conditions	 of	
Section	16814	are	usually	not	met	 for	a	share-rent	 tenant	 (and	
possibly	not	for	a	cash	rent	tenant).	If	that	is	the	case,	what	is	the	
proper	classification	for	residential	property?
Options for farm or ranch house classification 
	 One	 possibility	would	 be	 to	 classify	 the	 structure	 as	 non-
residential	 real	property	which	 is	depreciable	over	39	years.15 
However,	 residential	 rental	 property	 failing	 the	 test	 as	 27½-
year	property	would	not	be	a	candidate	for	non-residential	real	
property.
	 Another	potential	candidate	for	classification	would	be	seven	
year	property	–	on	the	grounds	that	a	farm	or	ranch	house	provided	
for	 a	 tenant	 does	 not	 have	 an	ADR	midpoint	 life	 and	 is	 not	
classified	elsewhere	under	the	classification	rules	now	in	place.16 
However,	it	would	seem	a	bit	strange	for	a	farm	machinery	shed	
to	be	classified	as	20-year	property	and	the	farm	or	ranch	house	
depreciated	as	seven-year	property	by	default.	
	 Finally,	the	more	likely	outcome	would	be	for	farm	and	ranch	
houses	 provided	 for	 a	 tenant	without	 payment	 of	 rent	 to	 be	
classified	as	20-year	property	and	be	handled	as	farm	buildings.	
Certainly that tends to be how the owner would likely view the 
house.
	 This	problem	was	called	to	the	attention	of	the	Internal	Revenue	
Service	by	this	author	in	late	1986,	after	enactment	of	the	Tax	
Reform	Act	 of	 1986,	 but	 no	 response	was	 received	 over	 the	
ensuing	22	years.
The bottom line 
	 Although	 there	 is	 some	room	for	argument,	 the	most	 likely	
outcome	would	be	that	a	new	farm	or	ranch	house,	built	in	2008,	
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CASES,	REGULATIONS	AND	STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr
FEDERAL  AGRICuLTuRAL 
PROGRAmS 
 ATTORNEY’S FEES.	The	plaintiff	was	a	successful	litigant	
of	an	appeal	of	a	Farm	Service	Agency	determination,	receiving	
a	final	ruling	in	the	plaintiff’s	favor	from	the	National	Appeals	
Division	and	the	director	of	the	NAD.	The	plaintiff	applied	to	the	
NAD for attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice 
Act,	5	U.S.C.	§	504.	The	NAD	denied	the	request,	ruling	that	the	
EAJA	did	not	apply	to	NAD	adjudications.	The	court	held	that	
Section	554	of	the	EAJA	provides	for	award	of	attorney’s	fees	and	
costs	in	administrative	proceedings	if	(1)	there	is	an	adjudication,	
an	agency	process	for	the	formulation	of	an	order,	that	is	required	
by	statute;	(2)	the	adjudication	must	be	on	the	record;	and	(3)	there	
must	be	an	opportunity	for	an	agency	hearing.	The	court	held	that	
both	(1)	and	(3)	were	clearly	present	in	NAD	proceedings.	The	issue	
was	whether	NAD	proceedings	were	“on	the	record”	because	there	
was	no	language	in	the	NAD	laws	that	specifically	required	that	the	
proceedings	be	on	the	record.	The	court	found	that	the	NAD	laws	
made	several	references	to	appeals	based	on	the	record	and	held	
that	NAD	proceedings	were	intended	to	be	on	the	record	and	were	
covered	by	Section	554	of	the	EAJA;	therefore,	attorney’s	fees	and	
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costs	were	awardable	for	successful	NAD	appeals.	Five Points 
Road Joint Venture v. Johanns, 2008 u.S. App. LEXIS 19148 
(7th Cir. 2008).
 CONFINED ANImAL FEEDING OPERATIONS. The EPA 
has	adopted	as	final	regulations	amending	the National Pollution 
Discharge	Elimination	System	(NPDES)	permitting	requirements	
and	Effluent	Limitations	Guidelines	and	Standards	 (ELGs)	 for	
concentrated	animal	feeding	operations	(CAFOs)	in	response	to	
the order issued in Waterkeeper Alliance et al. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 
486 (2d Cir. 2005).	The	final	regulations	modify	the	requirement	
to	apply	for	a	permit	by	specifying	that	an	owner	or	operator	of	
a	CAFO	that	discharges	or	proposes	to	discharge	must	apply	for	
an	NPDES	permit.	The	final	rule	also	includes	an	option	for	an	
unpermitted	CAFO	to	certify	to	the	permitting	authority	that	the	
CAFO	does	not	discharge	or	propose	to	discharge.	The	final	rule	
clarifies	 how	 the	 agricultural	 stormwater	 discharge	 exemption	
criteria	are	interpreted	for	unpermitted	large	CAFOs.	The	final	
regulations	also	require	CAFOs	seeking	permit	coverage	to	submit	
their	nutrient	management	plans	(NMPs)	with	their	applications	
for	individual	permits	or	notices	of	intent	to	be	authorized	under	
general	permits.	Permitting	authorities	are	required	to	review	the	
NMPs	and	provide	the	public	with	an	opportunity	for	meaningful	
public	review	and	comment	and	are	required	to	incorporate	terms	of	
NMPs	as	NPDES	permit	conditions.	Additionally,	the	regulations	
remove	the	provision	that	allowed	CAFOs	to	use	a	100-year,	24-
hour	containment	structure	to	fulfill	the	no	discharge	requirement	
for	new	source	swine,	poultry,	and	veal	calf	operations.	Instead,	
the	regulations	authorize	permit	writers,	upon	request	by	swine,	
poultry,	and	veal	calf	CAFOs	that	are	new	sources,	to	establish	
best	management	practice	no	discharge	effluent	limitations	when	
the	facility	demonstrates	that	it	has	designed	an	open	containment	
system	that	will	comply	with	the	no	discharge	requirements.	The	
regulations	have	not	yet	been	published	by	the	Federal	Register	but	
will	be	effective	30	days	after	such	publication.	See http://cfpub.
epa.gov/npdes/afo/cafofinalrule.cfm
 COTTON.	The	CCC	has	adopted	as	final	regulations	required	
by	the	Food,	Conservation,	and	Energy	Act	of	2008	(the	2008	Farm	
Bill)	to	administer	loan	and	payment	programs	for	upland	cotton	
and	extra-long	staple	(ELS)	cotton	producers	and	to	establish	new	
regulations	to	specify	payment	provisions	for	domestic	users	of	
upland	cotton.	The	2008	Farm	Bill	generally	extends	the	existing	
upland	 cotton	 and	ELS	 cotton	 programs	with	 some	 changes	
in	 calculations	of	 the	 adjusted	world	price	 and	 loan	 schedules	
for	 upland	cotton.	The	new	program	 for	 economic	 adjustment	
assistance	for	domestic	users	of	upland	cotton	will	pay	a	statutorily	
specified	rate	per	pound	and	provides	that	such	payments	may	only	
be	used	for	capital	investments	(for	example,	plant,	equipment,	
land,	machinery).	73 Fed. Reg. 65715 (Nov. 5, 2008).
 PERISHABLE AGRICuLTuRAL COmmODITIES ACT. 
A	creditor	made	a	secured	loan	to	an	affiliate	of	a	produce	dealer	
which	was	secured	by	units	 in	a	cooperative	purchased	by	 the	
produce	dealer.	The	produce	dealer	failed	to	pay	for	shipments	
of	produce	purchased	from	several	produce	suppliers	and	those	
suppliers	filed	complaints	against	the	produce	dealer.	The	produce	
dealer also defaulted on the secured loan and the creditor initiated 
foreclosure	proceedings	against	the	collateral.	The	suppliers	argued	
that	the	collateral	was	included	in	PACA	trust	property	and	should	
be	distributed	 to	 the	unpaid	suppliers.	The	creditor	argued	that	
the	cooperative	units	were	not	part	of	the	PACA	trust	because	(1)	
all	suppliers	were	paid	after	the	purchase	of	the	units	and	(2)	the	
grant	of	a	lien	on	the	units	removed	the	units	from	the	PACA	trust.	
The	court	held	that	the	creditor	failed	to	prove	that	all	PACA	trust	
recipients	were	paid	in	full	after	the	purchase	of	the	units	and	the	
grant	of	a	lien	on	the	units	did	not	remove	the	units	from	the	prior	
of the PACA trust as to those units. The court noted that the units 
were	security	for	the	affiliate	of	the	produce	dealer	and	remained	
viable	so	long	as	the	affiliate	had	not	fully	paid	on	the	loan. A&J 
Produce Corp. v. Bronx Overall Economic Development Corp., 
2008 u.S. App. LEXIS 19348 (2d Cir. 2008).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXATION
 ESTATE PROPERTY. The decedent had been the trustee 
of	 a	 trust	 formed	by	 the	 decedent’s	 pre-deceased	 spouse.	The	
decedent	had	only	an	income	interest	in	the	trust	but	the	decedent	
misappropriated	trust	corpus	and	used	the	funds	for	investing	in	
stocks.	The	decedent	had	commingled	the	misappropriated	funds	
with	the	decedent’s	own	property.	During	the	administration	of	
the	decedent’s	estate	the	executor	used	the	“debt	and	demands”	
procedure,	publishing	notice	to	estate	claimants	to	file	claims	within	
a	certain	period.	No	claims	against	the	decedent’s	estate	from	the	
trust	beneficiaries	was	made.	The	decedent’s	estate	filed	the	federal	
estate	tax	return	by	excluding	the	amount	of	misappropriated	funds.	
The	estate	argued	that	the	misappropriated	funds	were	not	owned	
by	the	decedent	but	were	merely	held	in	a	constructive	trust	for	
the	pre-deceased	spouse’s	trust’s	beneficiaries.	In	the	alternative,	
the estate argued that, if the funds were included in the decedent’s 
estate,	a	corresponding	deduction	should	be	allowed	for	the	claims	
of	the	trust’s	beneficiaries.		The	court	noted	that	no	claims	against	
the	estate	were	ever	filed	by	the	trust	beneficiaries.	The	court	held	
that	 the	misappropriated	funds	were	included	in	the	decedent’s	
estate	because	the	decedent	had	sufficient	dominion	and	control	
over	the	assets	at	the	time	of	death.	The	court	also	held	that	no	
deduction	for	claims	against	the	estate	was	allowed	because	(1)	
no	claims	had	been	or	were	being	made,	(2)	the	mere	breach	of	
fiduciary	duty	and	misappropriation	of	the	funds	did	not	give	rise	
to	an	indebtedness	of	the	estate	and	(3)	future	claims	against	the	
estate	were	barred	by	the	state	statute	of	limitations	against	such	
claims.		Estate of Hester v. united States, 2008-2 u.S. Tax Cas. 
¶ 60,568 (4th Cir. 2008), aff’g, 2007-1 u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 
60,537 (W.D. Va. 2007).
 GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS. The trust was 
created	and	became	irrevocable	prior	to	September	25,	1985.	The	
grantor	had	died	and	the	remainder	beneficiaries	discovered	an	
inconsistency	between	provisions	of	the	trust	as	to	the	termination	
of	the	trust	as	to	the	spouse’s	remainder	interest.	The	current	life	
interest	and	remainder	beneficiaries	reached	an	agreement	as	to	
the	interpretation	of	the	trust	provisions	which	amended	the	trust	
provisions.	The	IRS	ruled	that	the	agreed	amendment	of	the	trust	
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did	not	subject	the	trust	to	GSTT	because	the	amendments	did	not	
shift	the	beneficial	interest	of	a	current	beneficiary	to	a	person	in	a	
lower	generation.	The	IRS	also	ruled	that	the	amendments	did	not	
result	in	any	taxable	gift.	Ltr. Rul. 200845028, July 24, 2008.
 INSTALLmENT PAYmENT OF ESTATE TAX. The 
decedent was the sole shareholder of an LLC which owned a 
partial	tenant	in	common	interest	in	several	real	properties,	cash,	
stock	and	an	automobile.	The	other	co-owner	of	the	real	properties	
was	an	unrelated	company	which	hired	the	LLC	to	manage	the	
properties.	The	 decedent	 handled	 the	management	 duties	 and	
maintained	regular	business	hours	in	a	home	office	rented	to	the	
LLC.	Resident	managers	employed	by	the	LLC	provided	24-hour	
access	to	tenants.	The	automobile	was	used	by	the	decedent	in	
the	operation	of	the	LLC	business.		The	estate	elected	to	pay	the	
federal	estate	tax	in	installments.	The	IRS	ruled	that	the	decedent’s	
interest	 in	 the	LLC	qualified	 as	 an	 interest	 in	 a	 closely	 held	
business,	qualifying	the	estate	for	payment	of	federal	estate	tax	in	
installments,	because	the	LLC,	through	its	employees	and	agent,	
carried	on	an	active	business	of	a	real	estate	rental	operation.	Ltr. 
Rul. 200845023, Nov. 12, 2008. 
 FEDERAL INCOmE 
TAXATION
 ALImONY.	During	the	first	few	months	of	1993,	the	taxpayer	
and	spouse	were	married	but	were	negotiating	a	divorce	agreement.	
The	taxpayer	claimed	to	have	given	the	spouse	wage	checks	as	
spousal	support	under	a	written	agreement	but	no	agreement	was	
offered	in	evidence	and	the	spouse	denied	any	suvh	agreement.	
The	couple	was	divorced	in	March	1993	and	the	spouse	support	
agreement	was	entered	into	in	June	1993.	The	agreement	provided	
that	 all	payments	made	by	 the	 taxpayer	 to	 the	 spouse	 in	1993	
were	to	be	considered	spouse	support	taxable	to	the	spouse.	The	
taxpayer	claimed	that	the	divorce	agreement	was	a	restatement	
of	 the	prior	written	agreement.	The	taxpayer	claimed	the	1993	
payments	to	the	spouse	as	deductible	alimony.	The	court	held	that	
the	taxpayer	failed	to	prove	that	the	payments	were	made	under	a	
divorce	decree,	because	the	payment	were	made	before	the	divorce	
decree	was	entered,	or	a	similar	written	agreement.	The	taxpayer	
also	argued	that	the	payments	were	subject	to	double	taxation	if	the	
spouse	paid	taxes	on	the	payments	and	the	taxpayer	was	liable	for	
tax	on	the	payments	as	wages.	The	court	found	that	the	taxpayer	
failed	to	prove	that	the	spouse	paid	any	taxes	on	the	payments;	
therefore,	no	double	 taxation	would	occur	 from	 the	 taxpayer’s	
liability	 for	 the	 taxes.	Rafferty v. united States, 2008-2 u.S. 
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,470 (D. Colo. 2008).
	 The	 taxpayer	was	divorced	under	 a	decree	 that	 required	 the	
taxpayer’s	 former	 spouse	 to	pay	monthly	payments	 in	 spousal	
support.	The	 taxpayer	 did	 not	 include	 the	 amounts	 in	 taxable	
income,	arguing	that	the	payments	were	not	alimony	because	they	
were	called	spousal	support	in	the	decree.	The	divorce	decree	was	
not	presented	as	evidence	in	the	case.	The	court	held	that,	without	
evidence	that	the	divorce	decree	did	not	designate	the	payments	
as	excludible	from	income	by	the	taxpayer,	the	payments	met	the	
definition	of	alimony	and	were	taxable	as	income.		Reid v. 
Comm’r, T.C. memo. 2008-177.
 ALTERNATIVE mINImum TAX.	 	 The	 taxpayer	
received	employee	incentive	stock	options	from	an	employer	
and	had	 losses	 from	 the	exercise	of	 the	options.	Although	
the	 losses	were	 limited	under	 regulation	 income	 tax	 rules,	
the	 taxpayer	argued	 that	 the	 losses	were	not	 limited	under	
the	AMT	 because	 no	 statute	 or	 regulation	 covers	 stock	
option	losses	for	AMT	purposes.	The	court	held	that	the	IRS	
had issued guidance in Notice 2004-28, 2004-1 C.B. 783, 
that	AMT	stock	option	exercise	 losses	were	subject	 to	 the	
same	limitation	as	regular	losses,	under	I.R.C.	§	1211.		The	
court	upheld	the	IRS	interpretation	and	held	the	taxpayer’s	
stock	 option	 exercise	 losses	were	 subject	 to	 the	 I.R.C.	 §	
1211	limitation.			the	appellate	court	affirmed	in	an	opinion	
designated	as	not	for	pulbication.	Norman v. united States, 
2008-2 u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,467 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’g, 
2006-2 u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,429 (N.D. Calif. 2006).
 BuSINESS EXPENSES.	The	taxpayer	claimed	a	variety	
of	unreimbursed	employee	business	expenses	as	deduction	on	
Schedules	A	and	C.	The	taxpayer	did	not	provide	any	written	
records	to	substantiate	the	expenses,	claiming	that	the	records	
were	held	by	an	accountant,	 former	employer,	and	 former	
spouse.	Although	the	court	allowed	some	extra	time	for	the	
taxpayer	to	obtain	the	records,	no	records	were	produced	at	
trial.	The	court	held	that	the	deductions	were	properly	denied	
for	lack	of	sufficient	substantiation.	Hughes v. Comm’r, T.C. 
memo. 2008-249.
	 The	 taxpayer	 owned	 undeveloped	 rural	 property	which	
was	used	by	 the	 taxpayer’s	 family	 for	 camping	vacations.	
A	property	caretaker	lived	on	a	portion	of	the	property	in	a	
converted	camper	trailer	which	was	provided	as	part	of	the	
caretaker’s	compensation	for	maintaining	the	property.	The	
taxpayer	 included	 the	 rent	 received	 from	 the	 caretaker	 as	
taxable	rental	income	and	claimed	deductions	for	expenses	
associated	with	the	property,	resulting	in	tax	loss	deductions.	
The	 taxpayer	 also	 rented	 out	 a	 portion	 of	 the	 taxpayer’s	
residence	to	the	taxpayer’s	son	and	his	wife.	The	taxpayer	
included	the	rent	in	taxable	income	and	claimed	deductions	for	
expenses	attributable	to	the	rented	space.	The	court	held	that	
the	taxpayer	could	not	claim	deductions	for	expenses	above	
the	amount	of	rent	received	for	 the	rural	property	because	
the	taxpayer’s	use	of	the	property	for	vacations	exceeded	14	
days	per	year,	turning	the	use	into	residence-like	treatment.	
Similarly,	the	taxpayer	was	not	allowed	deductions	in	excess	
of	rent	received	for	the	rental	of	a	portion	of	the	taxpayer’s	
residence	because	the	taxpayer	provided	no	evidence	that	the	
rent	charged	was	 fair	market	 rent.	Riley v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Summary Op. 2008-142.
 DISABLED ACCESS CREDIT.	The	taxpayer	purchased	
access	 to	 a	 retail	 sales	web	 site	which	 paid	 commissions	
to	 the	 taxpayer	whenever	 someone	accessed	 the	 retail	 site	
and	 purchased	 something,	 usually	 after	 accessing	 the	 site	
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through	advertising	 set	up	by	 the	 taxpayer.	The	owner	of	 the	
retail	 site	offered	 to	modify	 the	 site	 to	make	 it	 accessible	 for	
people	with	disabilities	in	exchange	for	a	small	down	payment	
and	a	promissory	note.	The	 retail	 site	owner	claimed	 that	 the	
modifications	qualified	the	taxpayer	for	a	credit	under	I.R.C.	§	44.	
The	IRS	had	filed	suit	against	the	retail	site	owner	and	discovered	
that	the	modifications	were	made	to	only	one	site,	which	was	
accessed through all the subsidary sites such as the one sold to 
the	taxpayer.	Thus,	although	the	taxpayer	was	sold	a	package	for	
modifications,	no	new	modification	was	made.	The	court	held	
that	the	taxpayer	was	not	entitled	to	a	Section	44	credit	because	
the	expenditure	was	not	made	for	any	modification	to	make	the	
taxpayer’s	site	accessible	to	disabled	users.	Good v. Comm’r, 
T.C. memo. 2008-245.
 DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS.  The regulations  under 
I.R.C.	§	6050P	required	applicable	financial	entities,	as	defined	
in	1996,	to	issue	Forms	1099-C,	“Cancellation	of	Debt,”	upon	
the	occurrence	of	one	of	several	“identifiable	events”	as	provided	
in	Treas.	Reg.	§	1.6050P-1(b)(2)(i)(A)	through	(H).	One	of	these	
identifiable	events	requiring	the	issuance	of	a	Form	1099-C	was	
the	expiration	of	a	“non-payment	testing	period”	pursuant	to	Treas.	
Reg.	§	1.6050P-1(b)(2)(i)(H).		The	1996	regulations	created	a	
rebuttable	presumption	(the	“36-month	rule”)	under	Treas.	Reg.	
§			1.6050P-1(b)(2)(iv)	that	this	period	expired	if	a	creditor	had	
not	received	a	payment	for	36	months.	Treas.	Reg.	§	1.6050P-
1(b)(2)(iv)	provides	that	the	presumption	that	an	identifiable	event	
occurred can be rebutted by a creditor if the creditor had engaged 
in	significant,	bona	fide	collection	activity.	After	the	regulations	
were	adopted,	 the	Debt	Collection	Improvement	Act	of	1996,	
Pub.	L.	No.	104-134,	110	Stat.	1321	(1996),	expanded	I.R.C.	§	
6050P	to	cover	any	executive,	judicial,	or	legislative	agency	as	
well	as	any	applicable	financial	entity.	The	Ticket	to	Work	and	
Work	Incentives	Improvement	Act	of	1999,	Pub.	L.	No.	106-
170,	113	Stat.	1860	(1999),	further	expanded	I.R.C.	§	6050P	by	
expanding	the	definition	of	“applicable	financial	entity”	to	include	
any	organization	“a	significant	trade	or	business	of	which	is	the	
lending	of	money.”	The	 IRS	has	 issued	proposed	 regulations	
which	limit	the	application	of	the	36-month	rule	to	the	entities	
for	which	it	was	originally	intended	prior	to	the	changes	in	1996	
and	1999,	in	order	to	avoid	premature	information	reporting	of	
cancellation	of	indebtedness	income.	73 Fed. Reg. 66539 (Nov. 
10, 2008).
 DISASTER LOSSES. On October	24,	2008,	 the	president	
determined	that	certain	areas	in	Ohio	are	eligible	for	assistance	
from	the	government	under	the	Disaster	Relief	and	Emergency	
Assistance	Act	(42	U.S.C.	§	5121) as a result of a severe wiind 
storm,	which	began	on	September	14,	2008. FEmA-1805-DR. 
On	October	27,	2008,	the	president	determined	that	certain	areas	
in	Florida	are	eligible	for	assistance	from	the	government	under	
the Act as a result of Hurricane Gustav, which began on August 
31,	 2008. FEmA-1806-DR. Taxpayers	who	 sustained	 losses	
attributable	to	these	disasters	may	deduct	the	losses	on	their	2007	
returns.
 EmPLOYEE BENEFITS.	The	 IRS	 has	 adopted	 as	 final	
regulations	concerning	information	reporting	on	employer-owned	
life	 insurance	 contracts	 under	 I.R.C.	 §	 6039I.	The	 regulations	
generally	apply	to	taxpayers	that	are	engaged	in	a	trade	or	business	
and	that	are	directly	or	indirectly	a	beneficiary	of	a	life	insurance	
contract	covering	the	life	of	an	insured	who	is	an	employee	of	the	
trade or business on the date the contract is issued. 73 Fed. Reg. 
65982 (Nov. 6, 2008).
 HOBBY LOSSES.	The	taxpayer	was	a	medical	doctor	and	the	
taxpayer	and	spouse	started	raising	and	breeding	exotic	animals,	
first	as	a	small	hobby	involving	birds	and	later	as	a	large	operation	
involving	wild	 and	domestic	mammals.	The	 court	 held	 that	 the	
activity	was	not	operated	with	an	intent	to	make	a	profit	because	(1)	
although	the	taxpayer	maintained	accurate	and	separate	records,	the	
records	were	not	sufficient	and	were	not	used	to	analyze	the	profit-
making	capability	of	the	activity	to	enable	the	taxpayer	to	make	
changes	to	make	the	activity	profitable;	(2)	the	taxpayer	did	not	have	
sufficient	expertise	in	the	breeding	of	many	of	the	exotic	animals	
and	failed	to	consult	experts	before	acquiring	new	animals;	(3)	the	
taxpayers	did	not	have	a	reasonable	expectation	that	any	property	
appreciation	would	be	sufficient	to	offset	the	substantial	losses	from	
the	activity;	and	(4)	the	taxpayer	had	only	substantial	losses	from	
the	activity	which	were	used	 to	offset	 the	 taxpayer’s	 substantial	
income	 from	a	medical	 practice.	The	other	 factors	 under	Treas.	
Reg.	§	1.183-2(b)	were	found	to	be	neutral	on	the	issue	of	intent	to	
make	a	profit.	On	reconsideration	of	the	ruling,	the	taxpayer	argued	
that	the	burden	of	proof	should	have	been	shifted	to	the	IRS.	The	
Tax	Court	had	originally	ruled	that	a	determination	under	I.R.C.	§	
7491	did	not	need	to	be	made	because	the	case	was	decided	on	the	
preponderance	of	the	evidence.	The	taxpayer	argued	that	a	Section	
7491	determination	was	to	be	made	in	all	tax	cases.	The	Tax	Court	
disagreed,	holding	that	a	burden	of	evidence	determination	need	be	
made	only	where	both	sides	had	produced	equal	evidence.		Knudsen 
v. Comm’r, 131 T.C. No. 11 (2008), aff’g on reconsideration, T.C. 
memo. 2007-340.
 IRA.	The	taxpayers,	husband	and	wife,	incurred	medical	expenses	
in	2003	and	paid	the	expenses	with	the	proceeds	of	a	bank	loan.	In	
2004	the	taxpayers	received	an	early	distribution	from	a	qualified	
retirement	account	and	used	most	of	the	proceeds	to	pay	off	the	loan	
used	for	the	medical	expenses.	The	taxpayers	did	not	pay	the	10	
percent	penalty	for	early	withdrawals	because	the	taxpayers	claimed	
that	the	distribution	was	eligible	for	the	medical	payment	exception.	
The	 court	 held	 that	 the	 exception	 for	 a	 2004	 early	 distribution	
applied	only	for	medical	expenses	incurred	in	2004;	therefore,	the	
early	distribution	in	2004	did	not	qualify	for	the	exception	as	to	the	
2003	medical	expenses.		Evers v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 
2008-140.
 INNOCENT SPOuSE. The	taxpayers	were	husband	and	wife	in	
a	community	property	state	and	had	filed	three	joint	returns	which	
had	understated	the	tax	liability.	The	taxpayers	made	payments	on	
the	deficiency	over	several	years	using	community	property,	except	
for	one	payment	made	by	the	wife	from	her	separate	property.	The	
wife	filed	for	innocent	spouse	relief	for	the	joint	and	several	liability	
on	the	tax	debt	for	the	three	tax	years	and	the	IRS	granted	the	request	
as	 to	 the	 three	 tax	 years	 but	 provided	no	 refund	 except	 for	 the	
payment	from	separate	property.	The	wife	argued	that,	under	I.R.C.	
§	6015,	the	tax	payments	were	to	be	allocated	between	herself	and	
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her	husband,	even	though	the	taxpayers	were	still	married.	The	
Tax	Court	agreed	with	the	IRS	and	held	that	Section	6015	does	
not	preempt	community	property	law	as	to	refunds.	At	issue	
was	the	last	sentence	of	I.R.C.	§	6015(a):	“Any	determination	
under	this	section	shall	be	made	without	regard	to	community	
property	laws.”	The	IRS	argued	that	the	only	determination	in	
Section	6015(a)	was	whether	the	wife	was	entitled	to	innocent	
spouse	 relief,	 not	whether	 any	 refund	 should	 be	made.	 In	
addition,	the	refund	provision	of	I.R.C.	§	6015(g)	has	no	such	
provision	and	 remained	 subject	 to	 community	property	 law.	
The	 appellate	 court	 agreed	 and	held	 that,	 although	 the	wife	
was	properly	entitled	to	innocent	spouse	relief	from	joint	and	
several	 liability	 for	 the	 taxes,	 no	 refund	was	 allowed.	The	
appellate	ruling	is	designated	as	not	for	publication.		Ordlock 
v. Comm’r, 2008-2 u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,457 (9th Cir. 
2008), aff’g, 126 T.C. 47 (2006).
 PENSION PLANS.  For	 plans	 beginning	 in	November	
2008,	for	purposes	of	determining	the	full	funding	limitation	
under	I.R.C.	§	412(c)(7),	the	30-year	Treasury	securities	annual	
interest	rate	for	this	period	is	4.17	percent,	the	corporate	bond	
weighted	average	is	6.20	percent,	and	the	90	percent	 to	100	
percent	permissible	range	is	5.58	percent	to	6.10	percent.	Notice 
2008-105, I.R.B. 2008-48.
 RETuRNS.	CCH	has	reported	that,	under	the	Emergency	
Economic	Stabilization	Act	of	2008,	the	due	date	was	changed	
for	Copy	B	of	Form	1099-B,	Proceeds	from	Broker	and	Barter	
Exchange	Transactions;	 Form	1099-S,	 Proceeds	 from	Real	
Estate	Transaction;	 and	 Form	 1099	MISC,	Miscellaneous	
Income.	The	change	applies	only	if	substitute	payments	in	lieu	
of	dividends	and	tax-exempt	interest	or	payments	to	attorneys	
are	 reported.	CCH	also	 reports	 that	 an	 incorrect	due	date	 is	
printed	in	the	2008	General	Instructions	for	Forms	1099,	1098,	
5498,	and	W-2G,	and	in	the	instructions	on	the	reverse	side	of	
Copy	C	of	the	2008	Forms	1099-B,	1099-MISC,	and	1099-S.	
The	correct	date	is	February	17,	2009	if	substitute	payments	
are	reported	in	box	8	or	gross	proceeds	paid	to	an	attorney	are	
reported	in	box	14.	If	no	such	payments	are	reported,	February	
2,	2009,	remains	the	due	date	for	furnishing	Copy	B	of	Forms	
1099-MISC	to	recipients.	NEWS-FEDERAL, 2008TAXDAY, 
(Nov. 12, 2008), Item #I.
 S CORPORATIONS
	 SALE	OF	SHARES.	The	U.S.	Supreme	Court	has	granted	
certiorari in the following case.  The	taxpayer	was	a	50	percent	
shareholder	in	an	S	corporation.	The	other	shareholder	forced	
the	 taxpayer	 to	 sell	 the	 taxpayer’s	 shares	 to	 the	 corporation	
under	 the	 terms	of	 the	shareholder	agreement	and	corporate	
bylaws.		The	taxpayer	disputed	the	purchase	even	after	receiving	
the	payment	for	the	shares.		The	taxpayer	placed	the	funds	in	
a	separate	account	but	the	taxpayer’s	use	of	the	funds	was	not	
restricted.		The	taxpayer	did	not	include	the	gain	from	the	sale	
in	income	because	the	taxpayer	argued	that	the	sale	was	not	
complete	so	long	as	it	was	disputed.		The	court	held	that	the	
gain	was	recognized	by	the	taxpayer	when	the	proceeds	were	
received	because	there	was	no	restriction	on	the	taxpayer’s	use	
of	the	funds.	In	addition,	because	the	title	to	the	stock	remained	
in	the	taxpayer’s	name,	the	distributive	share	of	corporate	income	
was	included	in	the	taxpayer’s	income,	even	though	the	taxpayer	
had	no	role	in	the	corporation.	The	appellate	court	affirmed	in	
a	 decision	 designated	 as	 not	 for	 publication.	 	Hightower v. 
Comm’r, 2008-1 u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,185 (9th Cir. 
2008), aff’g, T.C. memo. 2005-274.
 SOCIAL SECuRITY TAXES.	The	nonprofit,	 tax-exempt	
taxpayer	operated	accredited	medical	residency	programs	for	
new	 doctors	who	 have	 completed	 their	medical	 education.	
The	 taxpayer	withheld	 and	paid	FICA	 taxes	 on	 the	 amounts	
paid	 to	 the	medical	 residents	 and	filed	 for	 a	 refund	of	 those	
payments,	arguing	that	the	medical	residents	qualified	for	the	
student	exception	under	I.R.C.	§	3121(b)(10).	The	IRS	sought	a	
summary	judgment	based	on	the	argument	that	medical	residents	
as	a	matter	of	law	could	never	qualify	for	the	student	exception.	
The	court	held	that	the	payments	to	the	residents	were	wages	
because	the	payments	were	received	in	exchange	for	services	
to	the	taxpayer.	However,	the	court	denied	summary	judgment	
and	held	that	the	determination	of	whether	the	stipends	paid	to	
medical	residents	were	subject	to	FICA	taxes	was	to	be	based	on	
the	nature	of	the	relationship	between	the	residents	and	the	payor	
of	the	stipend.	If	the	relationship	was	educational,	the	student	
exception	applied	to	relieve	the	stipends	from	FICA	tax.	The	
court	held	that,	as	a	matter	of	law,	the	hospital	was	not	precluded	
from	the	student	exception	and	substantial	fact	issues	remained	
which	prevent	summary	judgment.		united States v. Partners 
Healthcare System, Inc., 2008-2 u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,619 
(D. mass. 2008).
	 The	taxpayer	was	an	employer	whose	employee	in	a	prior	tax	
year	did	not	report	cash	tip	income	as	wages.	In	a	subsequent	tax	
year,	the	taxpayer	received	a	notice	and	demand	for	payment	of	
the	taxpayer’s	share	of	the	FICA	taxes	owed	on	the	tip	income	
and	the	taxpayer	paid	the	FICA	taxes.	The	taxpayer	sought	a	
credit	for	the	payment	of	the	taxes	in	the	tax	year	of	the	notice	
and	payment.	The	IRS	ruled	that	FICA	taxes	are	deemed	paid	
(1)	when	 the	 employee	 provides	 a	written	 statement	 of	 the	
amount	of	tips	received	by	an	employee	or	(2)	if	no	statement	
is	provided,	when	the	employer	receives	a	notice	and	demand	
for	payment	of	FICA	taxes	for	the	tips.	Therefore,	the	IRS	ruled	
that	the	I.R.C.	§	45B	tax	credit	for	payment	of	FICA	taxes	is	
available	for	the	taxpayer	in	the	tax	year	in	which	either	(1)	or	
(2)	occurs.	In	this	case,	because	the	tips	were	not	reported	to	the	
taxpayer,	the	tax	credit	was	available	in	the	tax	year	in	which	
the	taxpayer	received	the	ntoice	and	demand	for	payment	of	the	
taxpayer’s	share	of	the	FICA	taxes.		Ltr. Rul. 200845052, Sept. 
19, 2008.
 TAX SHELTERS. The	 taxpayer	 invested	 in	a	partnership	
which	 developed	 and	 operated	 jojoba	 farms.	The	 taxpayer	
claimed	tax	losses	more	than	double	the	initial	investment	in	the	
first	tax	year	and	additional	losses	in	following	years.	The	losses	
were	disallowed	because	the	partnership	was	held	to	be	a	sham	
tax	shelter.	The	issues	in	this	case	were	whether	the	taxpayer	
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was	 liable	 for	 the	 negligence	 component	 of	 the	 accuracy-
related	penalty	and	 the	understatement	of	 tax	component	 	of	
the	accuracy-related	penalty.	The	court	ruled	that	the	taxpayer	
had	not	acted	reasonably	in	failing	to	obtain	independent	expert	
advice	as	to	the	agricultural	viability	of	jojoba	farming	and	to	
the	 entitlement	 to	 investment	 and	 tax	 deductions.	 	Heller v. 
Comm’r, T.C. memo. 2008-232.
 TRuSTS.	The	IRS	has	identified	the	following	transactions	
and	similar	transactions	as	“transactions	of	interest”	which	are	
subject	to	the	reporting	rules	of	I.R.C.	§§	6111,	6112	and	Treas.	
Reg.	§	1.6011-4(b)(6).	A	grantor	creates	a	charitable	remainder	
trust	and	contributes	appreciated	assets	to	the	trust.	The	grantor	
retains an annuity or unitrust interest in the trust and designates 
a	 charity	 as	 the	 remainder	 beneficiary.	The	 charity	may,	 but	
need	not,	be	controlled	by	the	grantor	and	the	grantor	may,	but	
need not, reserve the right to change the charity designated as 
the	remainder	beneficiary.	Next,	the	trust	sells	or	liquidates	the	
appreciated	assets	and	reinvests	the	net	proceeds	in	other	assets	
such	 as	money	market	 funds,	marketable	 securities,	 and/or	
other	assets,	often	to	acquire	a	diversified	portfolio.	Because	a	
charitable	remainder	trust	generally	is	a	tax-exempt	entity	under	
I.R.C.	§	664,	the	trust’s	sale	of	the	appreciated	assets	is	exempt	
from	income	tax,	and	the	trust’s	basis	in	the	new	assets	is	the	
price	the	trust	pays	for	those	new	assets.	Some	portion	of	the	
trust’s	ordinary	income	and	capital	gains	may	become	taxable	to	
the	grantor	as	the	periodic	annuity	or	unitrust	payments	are	made	
by	the	trust	in	accordance	with	the	rules	of	I.R.C.	§	664	and	the	
regulations	thereunder.	Next,	the	grantor	and	the	charity,	in	a	
transaction	they	claim	is	described	in	I.R.C.	§	1001(e)(3),	sell	or	
otherwise	dispose	of	their	respective	interests	in	the	trust	to	an	
unrelated	third	party,	for	an	amount	that	approximates	the	fair	
market	value	of	the	assets	of	the	trust,	including	the	new	assets.	
The	trust	then	terminates,	and	the	assets	of	the	trust,	including	
the	new	assets,	are	distributed	to	the	unrelated	party.	The	grantor	
takes	the	following	positions	regarding	the	tax	consequences	of	
this	transaction.	The	grantor	claims	a	charitable	deduction	for	
the	portion	of	the	fair	market	value	of	the	appreciated	assets	as	
of the date of their contribution to the trust that is attributable 
to	the	remainder	interest.	The	grantor	claims	to	recognize	no	
gain	from	the	the	trust’s	sale	or	liquidation	of	the	appreciated	
assets.	When	 the	grantor	and	 the	charity	sell	 their	 respective	
interests	in	the	trust	to	the	unrelated	party,	the	grantor	and	the	
charity	take	the	position	that	they	have	sold	the	entire	interest	in	
the	trust	within	the	meaning	of	I.R.C.	§	1001(e)(3).	Because	the	
entire	interest	in	the	trust	is	sold,	the	grantor	claims	that	I.R.C.	§	
1001(e)(1),	which	disregards	basis	in	the	case	of	a	sale	of	a	term	
interest,	does	not	apply	to	the	transaction.	The	grantor	also	takes	
the	position	that,	under	I.R.C.	§	1001(a)	and	related	provisions,	
the	gain	on	the	sale	of	the	grantor’s	term	interest	is	computed	
by	taking	into	account	the	portion	of	uniform	basis	allocable	to	
the	grantor’s	term	interest	under	Treas.	Reg.	§§	1.1014-5	and	
1.1015-1(b),	and	that	this	uniform	basis	is	derived	from	the	basis	
of	the	new	assets	rather	than	the	basis	of	the	appreciated	assets.	
Notice 2008-99, I.R.B. 2008-47.
NEGLIGENCE
 FERTILIZER.	The	defendant	purchased	fertilizer	from	the	
plaintiff	that	was	applied	to	the	defendant’s	cotton	fields.	After	
the	crop	started	growing,	the	defendant	noticed	problems	with	
the	 plants	 and	 refused	 to	 pay	 for	 the	 fertilizer.	The	 plaintiff	
acknowledged	 that	 a	 problem	 could	 exist	 and	 allowed	 the	
suspension	of	payment	until	harvest	in	order	to	determine	whether	
any	 crop	 damage	 occurred.	After	 harvest,	 the	 defendant	 still	
refused	to	pay,	claiming	damage	to	 the	crop,	and	the	plaintiff	
sued	for	payment	on	the	contract.	The	defendant	counterclaimed	
that	 the	 fertilizer	was	misapplied.	The	 evidence	 showed	 that	
some	misapplication	of	fertilizer	occurred	but	the	plaintiff	made	
adjustments	 to	 correct	 the	misapplication.	The	 evidence	 also	
showed	that	the	defendant	had	applied	additional	fertilizer	and	
chemicals	which	could	have	caused	 the	damage	 to	 the	cotton	
plants.	The	 trial	 court	 ruled	 for	 the	 plaintiff	 and	 denied	 the	
counterclaims.	The	 appellate	 court	 affirmed,	 holding	 that	 the	
defendant	failed	to	provide	sufficient	evidence	that	the	plaintiff’s	
application	of	fertilizer	was	the	specific	and	single	cause	of	the	
crop	damage.	SE Co-op Service Co. v. Hampton, 2008 mo. 
App. LEXIS 962 (mo. Ct. App. 2008).
PROPERTY
 EmINENT DOmAIN.	The	plaintiff	owned	a	farm	of	over	
6,000	acres,	7.5	acres	of	which	bordered	a	public	highway.	The	
highway	was	scheduled	for	improvements	and	the	state	highway	
commission	condemned	the	7.5	acres	for	the	highway	project.	A	
valuation	commission	was	appointed	and	the	plaintiff	received	
an	award	of	$526,531	as	compensation	for	the	taking.	The	loss	
of	 the	 land	 removed	 several	 access	 points	 for	 the	 plaintiff	 to	
the	highway	and	the	plaintiff	complained	to	the	county	that	the	
alternative	 routes	were	 inadequate	 for	 the	 farm’s	 needs.	The	
county	applied	for	an	received	a	$1.5	million	grant	to	improve	
county	roads	but	was	not	required	to	make	the	improvements	only	
on	the	rads	to	the	plaintiff’s	farm.		The	plaintiff	raised	hogs	on	
6,000	acres	of	the	farm	before	the	condemnation	and	on	4,500	
acres	 after	 the	 condemnation.	The	 state	 highway	commission	
filed	exceptions	to	the	condemnation	award	at	the	time	it	was	
filed	in	1999	but	did	not	pursue	court	review	until	2007.	The	jury	
reduced	the	award	to	$267,000	and	the	court	required	the	plaintiff	
to	return	the	difference	with	interest.	On	appeal	the	court	upheld	
the	reduction	in	value,	holding	that	the	jury	properly	considered	
the	value	of	the	land	as	used	before	and	after	the	condemnation	
and	the	potential	affect	of	the	county	road	improvements.	State 
of missouri v. Greenwood, 2008 mo. App. LEXIS 1283 (mo. 
Ct. App. 2008).
STATE REGuLATION OF 
AGRICuLTuRE
 LIVESTOCK DEALERS.	The	plaintiff	was	a	livestock	broker	
who	purchased	hogs	known	 to	have	 tuberculosis	and	 internal	
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FARm INCOmE TAX, ESTATE AND 
BuSINESS PLANNING SEmINARS
by Neil E. Harl
January 6-10, 2009 
Outrigger Keauhou Beach Resort, Big Island, Hawai’i. 
	 Spend	a	week	in	Hawai’i	in	January	2009	and	attend	a	world-class	seminar	on	Farm	Income	Tax,	Estate	and	Business	Planning	
by	Dr.	Neil	E.	Harl.		The	seminar	is	scheduled	for	January	6-10,	2009	at	the	spectacular	ocean-front	Outrigger	Keauhou	Beach	
Resort	on	Keauhou	Bay,	12	miles	south	of	the	Kona	International	Airport	on	the	Big	Island,	Hawai’i.
	 Seminar	sessions	run	from	8:00	a.m.	to	12:00	p.m.	each	day,	Tuesday	through	Saturday,	with	a	continental	breakfast	and	break	
refreshments	included	in	the	registration	fee.	Each	participant	will	receive	a	copy	of	Dr.	Harl’s	400+	page	seminar	manual	Farm 
Income Tax: Annotated Materials	and	the	600+	page	seminar	manual,	Farm Estate and Business Planning: Annotated Materials, 
both	of	which	will	be	updated	just	prior	to	the	seminar.
	 The	Agricultural	Law	Press	has	made	arrangements	for	substantial	discounts	on	partial	ocean	view	hotel	rooms	at	the	Outrigger	
Keauhou	Beach	Resort,	the	site	of	the	seminar.		The	seminar	registration	fee	is	$645	for	current	subscribers	to	the	Agricultural 
Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual or the Principles of Agricultural Law.	The	registration	fee	for	nonsubscribers	is	$695.	
For	more	information	call	Robert	Achenbach	at	541-466-5544	or	e-mail	at	robert@agrilawpress.com.
lesions.	The	plaintiff	resold	the	hogs	but	told	the	buyers	only	that	
the	hogs	had	internal	lesions	and	something	like	tuberculosis.	The	
state	department	of	agriculture	notified	the	plaintiff	that	the	failure	
to	disclose	the	tuberculosis	to	buyers	was	a	violation	of	Ohio	Rev.	
Code	§	943.05(A)(2),	(5)	for	failing	to	keep	proper	records	and	for	
false	and	misleading	statements	regarding	the	health	of	the	hogs.	
The	state	revoked	the	plaintiff’s	livestock	dealer’s	license	and	the	
plaintiff	appealed,	arguing	that	Ohio	Rev.	Code	§	943.05(A)(2)	did	
not	apply	to	the	selling	of	animals.	The	court	held	that	the	statute	
did	apply	to	false	and	misleading	statements	about	the	health	of	
the hogs in the sale of the hogs. The court found that there was 
sufficient	evidence	that	the	plaintiff	failed	to	disclose	that	the	hogs	
were infected with tuberculosis. Egbert v. Ohio Department 
of Agriculture, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 4463 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2008).
IN THE NEWS
 ANImALS.	On	November	4,	2008,	California	voters	approved	
Proposition	2	with	63	percent	of	the	votes	in	favor	and	37	percent	
against.	The	ballot	measure	was	officially	known	as	the	Standards	
for	Confining	Farm	Animals	initiative	statute	and	added	a	chapter	
to	Division	20	of	the	California	Health	and	Safety	Code	to	prohibit	
the	confinement	of	certain	farm	animals	in	a	manner	that	does	not	
allow	 them	 to	 turn	around	 freely,	 lie	down,	 stand	up,	and	 fully	
extend	their	limbs	without	touching	another	animal	or	an	enclosure.	
The	measure	deals	with	three	types	of	confinement:	veal	crates,	
battery	cages,	and	sow	gestation	crates.	The	statute	will	become	
operative	on	January	1,	2015.	The	California	Secretary	of	State’s	
summary	from	the	Official	Voter	Information	Guide	of	Proposition	
2	was	as	follows:
	 “Requires	 that	 calves	 raised	 for	 veal,	 egg-laying	 hens	 and	
pregnant	pigs	be	confined	only	in	ways	that	allow	these	animals	
to	 lie	down,	 stand	up,	 fully	extend	 their	 limbs	and	 turn	around	
freely.”
	 Exceptions	are	provided	for	 transportation,	rodeos,	 fairs,	4-H	
programs,	lawful	slaughter,	research	and	veterinary	purposes.	The	
new	law	provides	misdemeanor	penalties,	including	a	fine	not	to	
exceed	$1,000	and/or	imprisonment	in	jail	for	up	to	180	days.
	 Several	 states,	 Florida,	Arizona,	Oregon	 and	Colorado,	 have	
similar	laws	prohibiting	the	use	of	gestation	crates	for	sows.
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